

## YEMEN CONTINUES TO HOLD US OFFICIALS

Yemeni officials continue to proclaim that the two US AID officials imprisoned in Yemen will be brought to trial. It remains evident, however, that Egypt is calling the tune in the matter, and in Cairo there have been reassurances of their release.

After considerable delay, US approaches to Egyptian Foreign Ministry officials finally elicited the assurance of Foreign Minister Riyadh that the two Americans would be released soon without trial. The Egyptians, who continue to assert that they are trying to be helpful in ending the crisis in US relations with Yemen, also advised US officials in Cairo that they should not be upset by any contrary Yemeni declarations of the next few days. Although interrogation of the two imprisoned Americans has been continued, they have been well treated by the Egyptian investigators and have been visited by the commander of the Egyptian forces.

Cairo delayed the departure of a four-man US Embassy team from Cairo going to Taiz to re-

cover the AID files there, presumably until Egyptian intelligence could go through them. Permission was finally granted and the team arrived in Taiz on 11 May.

The Egyptians, [redacted]

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[redacted] are undoubtedly seeking to reduce any US presence in Yemen to the barest minimum. On 8 May the Yemeni foreign office asked that the US consul in Taiz be transferred to Sana "for his personal safety," and that the consulate be closed.

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The Yemeni regime appears to be incapable of understanding that it is caught in the middle of a crisis in US-Egyptian relations. The same Yemeni officials who continue to issue statements indicating that the two prisoners would be brought to trial are also issuing statements claiming that Yemen would still like to receive US assistance. They say Yemen hopes exposure to the American people of the prisoners' "perfidious acts" will still allow continuation of friendship between the US and Yemen. [redacted]

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## GREECE STILL QUIET UNDER NEW REGIME

The new regime in Greece appears to have achieved a modus vivendi with King Constantine, who now lends his presence to the government's individual actions in return for the junta's support for the monarchy and a voice in its councils. No effective antiregime activity has been reported, and despite the many restrictions which have been imposed, the daily life of most citizens has returned to near normal.

There is still little indication that the new government has a clear program or set of priorities. It seems preoccupied with establishing the guilt of its political opponents, the most prominent of whom are still imprisoned, and with cleaning out the administration. A great mass of evidence seized in the first hours after the 21 April coup is now being sifted for use in the political trials to come. Andreas Papandreou and three other deputies associated with the leftist "Aspida" conspiracy are to be tried for high treason. The government initiated a press campaign aimed at implicating George Papandreou as well, but subsequently permitted him to deny the authenticity of the allegations, and then released him.

The government has announced that a new constitution, embodying much of the last one, will be drawn up by a panel of 20 jurists and then submitted to a national referendum. A general election, the date of which government spokesmen refuse to set even tentatively, is supposed to follow.

Repercussions of recent events in Greece are being felt in Cyprus, despite the Makarios government's efforts to maintain a neutral stance. Fearing repression in an Athens-inspired coup on the island, the pro-Communist AKEL leadership has placed itself under the protection of its erstwhile enemy, Minister of the Interior Georkatzis. This prevented clashes between Communists and anti-Communists during the delayed Labor Day celebrations held on 7 May, but it did not alter the basic situation.

The positions of both President Makarios and Cypriot armed forces commander Grivas vis-a-vis the new Athens government are unclear.

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The Turkish Cypriot leadership is still maintaining its defensive posture, but appears encouraged by threats to Makarios' control of the island. It would probably welcome a move by Athens against Makarios and would remain on the sidelines in any ensuing struggle, unless "instant enosis" were attempted.

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## CONGRESS PARTY WINS INDIA'S PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST

India's Congress Party has emerged victorious from its first major confrontation with its opposition since its setback in the legislative elections earlier this year. Incumbent Vice President Zakir Husain, the party's candidate for president of India, won by an unexpectedly comfortable margin in the 6 May election. His running mate, V. Giri, was also successful.

Past presidential elections have been largely rubber-stamp affairs, since the Congress Party always held overwhelming majorities in the electoral college--the elected members of Parliament and the state legislatures. This time, however, with Congress holding only a slim majority among the electors, leaders of seven of the major opposition parties succeeded in uniting behind a candidate of their own--former chief justice K. Subba Rao.

Their primary motivation in joining forces was not so much any personal objection to Husain--a widely respected Muslim educator--as it was an attempt to embarrass Prime Minister Gandhi and her government, provoke a crisis of confidence among Congress rank-and-file, and perhaps even topple the government.



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HUSAIN

Husain's substantial majority underscores the continuing lack of real cohesion among Congress' opponents and indicates that there were sizable defections from the splintered opposition. It also gives a badly needed boost to Congress' prestige. Contrary to some predictions, northern Hindus did not desert Congress ranks in great numbers to vote against a Muslim in the secret ballot.

Mrs. Gandhi, who had run up against considerable opposition within the Congress Party hierarchy, when she promoted Husain's candidacy, may now find her hand strengthened against criticism generally of her leadership.

The presidency until now has been a largely ceremonial office. Husain, however, could wield important powers during his five-year term should no party in Parliament hold a clear majority or should the majority party be torn by factional disputes. He reportedly favors a strong central government and improvement of relations with Pakistan, but his influence on policy is likely to be minimal.

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
## NIGERIA'S WESTERN REGION CONFRONTS FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The focus of the Nigerian crisis is now on the confrontation between the northern-dominated Federal Military Government (FMG) and the Western Region, with the East waiting in the wings to profit from developments.

FMG head Lt. Col. Gowon is backtracking on his initial agreement to the West's demand that Northern soldiers in the region, including those just outside Lagos,

be replaced by 31 May. Yielding to pressure from his hard-line advisers, Gowon now has said publicly that for security reasons this is not the time to move his Northern troops out of the West.

In the face of such FMG procrastination, Western Governor Adebayo boycotted the meeting of the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in Lagos on 8 and 9 May, although he sent representatives.



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Reportedly, he will not attend any further SMC meetings until the Northern troops are removed.

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A newly formed National Conciliation Committee, composed of senior civilian notables from all parts of the country except the East and apparently blessed by Gowon, sent a delegation under the West's most influential civilian, Chief Awolowo, to persuade Eastern Governor Ojukwu to send representatives to the committee's next meeting. This civilian initiative to provide a Nigerian forum for seeking a solution to the crisis gives Ojukwu an opportunity to enter negotiations on Nigeria's future governmental structure. Whether he takes advantage of it depends on the relative influence exerted by the moderates and the hard liners around him.

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The Northern Region leadership has explicitly reaffirmed its support for a strong central government in a communiqué of 5 May, which also endorsed the FMG plan gradually to restore civilian rule by 1969. The Northern leaders said nothing about the recent developments in the West--which apparently sharpened the divisions among the Northern factions--but did express great dismay at the SMC's failure to deal effectively with Eastern defiance.

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The Northern communiqué indicates that the dominant political and military elements there--also pre-eminent in Gowon's federal regime--are not yet ready to accept the formula for a loose association of regions now embraced by both Eastern and Western regions. The small and tribally fragmented Mid-Western Region has not yet made clear its position on this formula but is under growing pressure to join in a common front against the North.

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several months, a vitriolic propaganda war has been waged between self-styled "revolutionary intellectuals" associated with the Peking-financed weekly newspaper Dipanda and rival extremists in the federation. In addition, factionalism within the organization itself led to the exclusion from its recent national congress of three of the country's best known old-line leftist labor leaders. A resolution demanding immediate nationalization of the economy capped this meeting but was publicly ridiculed by President Masamba-Debat as unrealistic.

Since late 1966, the regime's poorly disciplined paramilitary youth forces have been involved in a number of altercations; they have brutalized civilians, harassed government officials throughout the country, and clashed with regular police and military forces. On 14 April, in perhaps the most serious incident, a Cuban-trained Civil Defense Corps unit attacked and destroyed the police station at Pointe-Noire in retaliation for the arrest of one of its members for a minor infraction.

There is reportedly some fear within the government that

this incident may cause the police to join with traditionally antiregime elements in the gendarmerie and army in seeking to control the paramilitary youth. The emergence of such an alliance would serve to further sharpen the already serious dissension within the regime.

Restiveness within the largely French-trained regular military forces is long-standing and deeply rooted. Although the military suffered a net loss of prestige and capability in the aftermath of last year's abortive army mutiny, there is evidence that radicals still consider them, especially the 1,600-man gendarmerie, a potential threat.

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
## FACTIONALISM PLAGUES CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) REGIME

Political tensions in radical-dominated Congo (Brazzaville) continue to be marked by sporadic violence and increasingly heated public exchanges.

The currents underlying these tensions have no discernible principal focus, but involve contending factions within and among the government, the single political party and its mass or-

ganizations, and military and paramilitary forces. These frictions could come to a head during the party's national congress expected sometime between now and the end of July, the first since the party was formed three years ago.

Some of the current tension revolves around the regime's single labor federation. For



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## WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Commentary and follow-up activity on decisions reached at last month's summit meeting in Uruguay are still being given considerable attention by a number of Latin American governments.

Peruvian Foreign Minister Vasquez, who earlier had briefed his country's Senate on the presidents' meeting in terms rather critical of the US, spoke to the lower chamber on 4 May on the same subject but this time avoided blaming Washington for the "shortcomings" of the summit. Delegates to the 12th annual session of the UN's Economic Commission for Latin America now meeting in Caracas have given some attention to the summit's guidelines on Latin American economic integration, although their major concern has been with the trade problems of underdeveloped countries.

Several governments remain preoccupied with problems affecting their domestic stability. Government forces in Bolivia continue to engage in sporadic clashes with guerrillas, and appear to be reacting just about as ineffectively as they did when the guerrillas first appeared two months ago. Dominican President Balaguer's tough 8 May speech may not succeed in stemming recently increasing political terrorism and may in fact serve to accelerate the trend toward a sharp left-right polarization in Dominican politics. In Guatemala, the activities of rightist terrorists in the capital have recently increased again, but the Mendez government believes it has the situation under control.

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## RENEWED GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA

Guerrillas ambushed an army patrol in southeastern Bolivia on the night of 8 May, inflicting light casualties on the government force. This incident is the first reported encounter with the insurgents since 25 April. Once again, government losses are attributed to poor training and lack of experience.

The army's strategy has been to try to encircle the guerrillas, cutting off avenues of escape and access to food and supplies, rather than to engage in a direct confrontation against a well-armed and disciplined insurgent band. This strategy will continue until the newly formed 2nd Ranger Battalion, now located in Santa Cruz, has completed three or four months of US-sponsored counterinsurgency training. It is then scheduled to move into the guerrilla zone to conduct search-and-destroy operations.

Guerrilla successes against the army may be spurring other dissident elements into action.

President Barrientos is pressing the US for additional automatic weapons, bombs, and support aircraft. He feels, as do his military commanders, that these supplies are necessary to enhance the morale of the Bolivian forces, increase their aggressiveness, and promote their combat efficiency. He tends to discount the need for training in the use of new weapons.

Failure to move soon against the guerrillas, however, may permit them to exfiltrate the encirclement and establish a safe haven elsewhere.

Although the guerrillas do not pose an immediate threat to political and economic stability, prolongation of the insurgency will force the government to divert its meager economic resources to military use as well as cut back needed development projects. The short-term effect would be a slowdown in economic progress with a concomitant increase in popular discontent. Moreover, the failure of the government's counterinsurgency campaign could further strain relations between Barrientos and the armed forces--his most important power base.

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## DOMINICAN PRESIDENT REACTS TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Recent incidents of political violence and terrorism have posed major new problems for President Balaguer. The most politically sensitive was the apparent fire bomb attack on Casimiro Castro, a prominent senator of the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), on 4 May. Other incidents that have aroused concern over the government's ability to maintain order include the killing of a US teacher and an attack on the government's director of telecommunications.

The PRD saw the Castro incident as further proof of its allegations that Balaguer, through inaction, has created a climate in which rightist terrorists can thrive. In a move designed to underscore this point and pressure the government, the PRD announced that its minority congressional delegation would boycott the legislature.

The Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), a small but significant group, reacted to the Castro incident by threatening to junk its policy of "constructive opposition" and adopt a more militant stance toward Balaguer. Over the last several weeks the PRSC leadership has been intensifying its attacks on the President, accusing him of violating the constitution.

Balaguer responded to criticism in a hard and uncompromising

speech on 8 May. He absolved the government of responsibility for terrorism. He portrayed an exaggerated picture of Communist capabilities and activities and said the far left was responsible for much of the violence. The President has subsequently begun establishing a special military tribunal--headed by one military officer--which will try all crimes of political terrorism and subversion.

In his speech Balaguer placed considerable blame for the deteriorating political situation on the PRD, which he indirectly characterized as "the intellectuals behind the crime of terror" and "the systematic opponents of the government." Balaguer implied that Castro had not been attacked but had wounded himself accidentally and said the PRD congressional boycott merely added "fuel to the fire."

Balaguer's response indicates he has rejected a policy of accommodation and compromise with his opponents--particularly those on the left. Instead, he seems willing to adopt strong measures that will strengthen his position among conservative and right-wing backers and allay military unease. His approach also seems likely, however, to promote leftist counteractions and encourage political polarization.

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## CONTINUING PROBLEMS FOR CHILE'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS

The Frei government in Chile is heading into a long cold winter of political maneuvering and reassessment. The disappointing showing of President Frei's Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in the last month's municipal elections and its poor prospects in next month's senatorial by-election have heartened Frei's opponents inside the party, and stimulated a full-fledged re-examination of policy by the PDC leaders.

There are several reasons for the PDC's current difficulties. First of all, the party is suffering from the midterm loss of popular support frequently experienced by a party in power. Some of its reform programs have lost steam, whereas others have yet to be started. Voters who united behind Frei in 1964 rather than back his pro-Castro opponent have returned to their historic multiparty tradition. PDC leaders are therefore trying to infuse some much-needed spirit into their "revolution in liberty" campaign promise.

The present PDC leadership strongly supports President Frei's administration. Control of the party is being challenged, however, by two dissident groups. The left-wing "rebel" group--which nearly won the party presidency

in 1965--claims that the administration has lost its revolutionary fervor and is not pressing its reform program vigorously enough. This group sees in the municipal election results a vindication of its criticism of the administration, and it certainly will mount a strong campaign for control of the party at the PDC convention later this year.

The "third position" group purports to occupy the ground between the rebels and the leadership. This faction actually backs the rebel position, but is somewhat less vocal.

President Frei, faced with an obstinate opposition in the Senate, needs firm backing from his own party to implement the social and economic reforms he has pledged and to conduct the active foreign policy to which he aspires. PDC officials have selected Jaime Castillo, a [redacted] cabinet minister, as the party's candidate for the special senatorial by-election on 11 June. He is not expected to defeat the Socialist candidate--the widow of the former incumbent--but he must make a strong showing to avoid increased left-wing attacks on the party leadership. [redacted]

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## DISSENSION WITHIN URUGUAY'S GOVERNING PARTY

Uruguay's governing Colorado Party is plagued with factionalism, and a serious split may have been only temporarily avoided.

At the heart of the dissension is the competition for long-range control of the party between President Gestido, who has been in office less than three months, and young Jorge Batlle. Batlle, who heads a party faction known as "List 15," hopes to win the presidency in 1971. He therefore is reluctant to support Gestido's programs unquestioningly for fear of compromising his position as a national leader and spoiling his image as a bright, independent-minded, responsible politician.

Two recent quarrels--one on the local level, the other over appointments to the directorships of key government-controlled enterprises--received national publicity. The first resulted in the Batlle faction's voting with the opposition to interpellate the interior minister. The second concerned Batlle's initial refusal

to support Gestido's list of candidates for the directorships. Although these differences appear to have been patched up, hard feelings remain. Batlle probably decided to avoid a complete split only because it would not "look good" to break with Gestido so early in his administration.

Batlle has stated that his faction will continue its independent criticism of Gestido's government but that it will stop short of an open break. "List 15" legislators are likely to continue to vote against Gestido on occasion. This practice is certain to increase the tension within the party and heighten the probability of an eventual split. The Colorados have only a slim congressional majority--one seat in the Chamber and three in the Senate. If "List 15" denies Gestido its support on key issues or adopts delaying tactics, the legislation urgently needed to curb Uruguay's spiraling cost of living and improve its stagnating economy will probably be in serious trouble.

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## ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES PRESSURE AGAINST LABOR

The Ongania government is continuing its pressure against Argentina's disorganized and weakened General Confederation of Labor (CGT), in an effort to prevent effective opposition to economic reforms.

The government has made a series of moves to weaken the unions that make up the CGT. In some cases it has suspended the legal status of unions and refused to permit their leaders to attend a proposed CGT congress. This decision affects such prominent labor figures as Augusto Vandor, the country's most powerful union boss, and Andres Framini, a leftist Peronist.

The Ongania regime, unlike previous authoritarian regimes, has not moved against the CGT directly, however, apparently because the action taken against member unions has been effective

enough in disrupting efforts to organize strikes and demonstrations against reforms. The unions oppose the revised work rules for dock and railroad workers, as well as currency devaluation and restrictions on wage increases. They claim that these policies put the burden of ending the chronic inflation on the back of the laboring class.

Although a truce existed between labor and the government during the first six months of Ongania's rule and some negotiations were held, it now seems highly unlikely that the earlier rapport can be restored. The government now seems to want to deal with new labor representatives. The present union leadership, however, may try to retain control of the 2.5-million-man CGT by operating through front men acceptable to the government.

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